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Abstract 
In 2015, the Agriculture for Growth Act (C-18) came into effect in Canada. This Act modernized 
plant breeding by including amendments that aligned it with the 1991 International Convention 
for the Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV 91) (CFIA, 2017). Regulations within the Act 
grant plant breeders the right to charge an end-point royalty (EPR) on harvested grain. This 
thesis is interested in assessing how provenance and framing, influence pulse producer seed 
choice decisions. This study created a prospect theory behavioral experiment to answer this 
question. The study concluded that producers are not overly influenced by provenance and 
framing and instead make decisions based on the expected utility model, except when questions 
are manipulated by both EPR and negative framing. The study also concluded that most 
producers (56%) are willing to tolerate a level of risk. This provided a way to profile producers 
by risk tolerance and found many similarities and few minor differences between those that are 
always risk-seeking, always risk-averse, and occasionally risk-seeking.  
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1. Introduction 
 A common policy problem is that theory proposes solutions and policy makers often 
emulate policy that worked in one area without evidence that will succeed in another. Policy 
should be evidence based. The study used end-point-royalties (EPRs) and specifically their 
success in Australian wheat breeding and applied it to Western Canadian pulse breeding. The 
study looked for evidence that pulse producers will behave in a similar manner to Australian 
wheat producers. 
From food to fork, innovation has been at the center of Canadian agriculture. However, 
for research and development to flourish, sufficient funding for projects is necessary. Funding 
comes from various institutions, including public, private, and not-for-profit organizations. To 
risk their capital, many of these organizations require a sufficient return on investment (ROI). 
Excludability, which is the ability to exclude others from the use of private property, is a key 
element to generating an ROI. Usually, prospective users are required to pay a fee for the use of 
private property and those who do not pay are excluded from use. In plant breeding, there are 
various private property mechanisms that allow owners to charge a fee and generate an ROI on 
research and development. Some of the more common mechanisms include patents, copyright, 
industrial designs, trade secrets etc.  
Pulse breeding in Saskatchewan is partially funded by a mandatory 0.67% checkoff on 
harvested grain and from other public and private institutions. Voluntary and mandatory 
checkoffs are not related to return on investment for intellectual property. Instead they were 
created by regulatory mechanisms that enable producers to charge a levy on harvested grain, 
regardless of the variety developer. Checkoffs are a policy instrument that allows producers to 
organize and charge levies to collectively fund research, market development, market extension, 
		 2 
and communications. Royalties embedded in seed price, royalties paid through contract 
technology use agreements, and end-point royalties are all intellectual property instruments that 
directly enable plant breeders to capture a return on their investments.  
 In Saskatchewan, the University of Saskatchewan Crop Development Centre (CDC) 
began pulse breeding in the 1970s. Because of inadequate pulse breeding funding, the CDC 
formed an agreement with the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers Association (SPG) in 1997. The 
CDC also partners with the University of Saskatchewan, the Government of Saskatchewan, 
BASF, and other organization to produce new pulse varieties. In return for their checkoff, 
Saskatchewan pulse producers access pulse varieties funded from this partnership royalty free. 
The levies are gathered by SPG to fund pulse breeding research, market development, and other 
pulse industry related activities.  
Provisions in the Agriculture Growth Act (C-18) could incentivize private sector 
involvement in pulse breeding. Added funding by private firms in pulse variety development 
could generate superior yielding varieties for Canadian pulse producers but at a higher price. 
Industries that are dominated by the private sector can create a toll good environment that allows 
monopolies to flourish and charge monopoly prices for new plant varieties (Gray and Alston, 
2013). As a result, Saskatchewan pulse producers will have the ability to choose pulse seed bred 
under various breeding systems and marketed under different royalty and pricing arrangements.   
There are many theories that attempt to predict human decision making, the most 
prevalent being the rationally based models. These theories assume that human are rational 
beings and therefore will always choose the most rational option or the choice that generates the 
most utility. However, in 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky challenged the rational 
model of decision making and created Prospect Theory, which included an experiment that 
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concluded human choices are influenced by framing, even in a situation when the expected 
utility of options to a problem are equal. These theorists exposed a cognitive bias in human 
decision making in that individuals are not fully rational and framing influences preferences.  
This study conducted a prospect theory behavioral experiment to study the effects of 
framing and provenance on pulse producer decision making. This study tested to determine if 
there is a pulse producer bias towards EPRs or checkoff funded varieties and bias towards 
positive and negative framing. To test these preferences, this study created a modified version of 
Asian Disease experiment made famous by Kahneman and Tversky. Respondents got two 
prospect theory problems which were allocated in a way that each got one questions related to a 
checkoff and one related to EPR. The problems were also differentiated in a way that all 
respondents received choices framed in the negative and positive domain. This study also asked 
various demographic and business related questions and cross tabulated some of these with data 
from the prospect theory questions to get a better idea of who the risk-seekers and risk-averse 
farmers are and where they get their decision-making information. 
This study concludes that regardless of provenance or framing manipulations, most 
farmers choose the risk-averse option. Farmers are more likely to get information and advice on 
crop choices from personal experience, agronomists, family, and agri-business and less likely to 
get it from the internet and other media. Also, they overall prefer pulses, cereal, and oilseed 
financed through royalties imbedded in seed and voluntary checkoffs and least prefer mandatory 
checkoffs, technology use agreements, and EPRs. Most farmers are willing to accept some risk; I 
have tested for differences between those always risk-seeking, always risk-averse, and 
occasional risk-seekers.  
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Risk-seekers are generally the first adopters of technology and they also influence others 
to adopt a technology. For new biotechnologies like pulse seed breeding to move forward, risk-
seekers need to adopt and grow new seeds. If Canada is to adopt a new seed breeding policy and 
system it is important to discover who the risk-seekers are in the pulse growing community and 
who they are influenced by to communicate effectively with them and to get their input on policy 
that affects them and the pulse sector. 
 
2. Background 
Intellectual Property 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) defines intellectual property (IP) 
as the “creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; designs; and 
symbols, names and images used in commerce" (WIPO, 2016.p.2). In Canada, there are various 
types of IP including patents, trademarks, copyrights, plant breeder’s rights, and trade secrets. In 
Canada, each of these different mechanisms protects different types of knowledge, with varying 
time in which property can be protected.  
Intellectual property allows “people to earn recognition or financial benefit from what 
they invent or create. By striking the right balance between the interests of innovators and the 
wider public interest, the IP system aims to foster an environment in which creativity and 
innovation can flourish” (WIPO, 2016, p.1). IP fosters innovation because it enables the owners 
to exclude others from using the property unless a monetary fee is paid. This incentivizes 
individuals to fund research and development because their future return of investment is 
protected from free-riders. Although IP can create an atmosphere where innovation can flourish, 
there are those that argue that IP creates a barrier to innovation.  
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2-1. Types of Intellectual Property 
Type of IP What Does It Cover? How Long is it Protected For 
Trademarks “One or a combination of words, sounds or 
designs used to distinguish the goods or 
services of one person or organization from 
those of others” (CIPO, 2016, p.2). 
15 yrs. (CIPO, 2016, p.2) 
Patents "Cover new and useful inventions (product, 
composition, the machine, process) or any new 
and useful improvement to an existing 
invention" (CIPO, 2016, p.2). 
20 yrs. (CIPO, 2016, p.2) 
Copyright "Provides protection for literary, artistic, 
dramatic or musical works (including computer 
programs) and other subject-matter knew as 
performer's performances, sound recordings 
and communication signals" (CIPO, 2016, p.2). 
50 yrs. after the death of 
creator (CIPO, 2016.p.3) 
Industrial 
Design 
"Visual features of shape, configuration, pattern 
or ornament or any combination of these 
features applied to a finished article"(CIPO, 
2016, p.2). 
10 yrs. (CIPO, 2016, p.3) 
PBR New plant varieties (CFIA, 2016, p.6).  Trees and vines: 25 yrs. 
Other plant varieties: 20 yrs. 
(CFIA, 2016, p.6). 
 
Some academics believe IP should be used in a limited sense. They view free competition 
as the default market condition and IP should have a limited use which would encourage 
innovation (Lemley, 2005). As opposed to the protectionist view of IP, this limited version does 
not allow owners to capture full rents. The result has “historically been intellectual property 
rights that are limited in time, limited in scope, and granted only to authors and inventors who 
met certain minimum requirements. On this view, the proper goal of intellectual property law is 
to give as little protection as possible consistent with encouraging innovation” (Lemley, 2005, 
p.1031). This weaker version of IP would allow owners to capture sufficient benefits to warrant 
investment in research and development yet would eventually allow others to benefit from this 
knowledge. UPOV 91 has been developed using this version of IP, because it allows developers 
to exclude others from using their protected seeds, yet allows academics to use these seeds 
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royalty free for the use of scientific research. This ensures that plant breeders and researchers 
both have incentives to work on and fund seed breeding innovation. Another reason is the 
germplasm-sharing agreements brokered by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO). This agreement allows plant breeders to use germplasm from other 
countries royalty free with the caveat that varieties created from these germplasms must be 
publically available to researchers. 
The goal of the protectionists view on IP is to have an unlimited time frame and scope for 
IP. These scholars treat “intellectual property not as a limited exception to the principle of 
market competition, but as a good in and of itself” (Lemley, 2005, p.1031). They view 
intellectual property and real property as synonymous. In their view, “intellectual property is 
simply a species of real property rather than a unique form of legal protection designed to deal 
with public good problems” (Lemley, 2005, p.1031-1032). For example, just like individuals 
have the right to exclude others from real property, firms and inventors also has the right to 
exclude others indefinitely from using IP they have created and protected. These protections help 
creators internalize externalities and eliminate free-riding (Lemley, 2005).  
Heller (1998), argues that a protectionist IP framework can create the tragedy of the anti-
commons, which occurs when too many people can exclude others from the use of knowledge or 
property and this causes society to underuse resources (Heller, 1998). In this theory, many 
people own fragments of knowledge, but no individuals own a full bundle that would be 
necessary to innovate, so that each individual owner uses their IP to block others from obtaining 
the required knowledge to innovate (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). This theory is opposed to the 
tragedy of the commons idea revived by Hardin in which insufficient excludability causes 
society to overuse a resource (Hardin, 1968). 
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Some believe that the protectionist view of intellectual property stifles innovation 
because strict IP law adds financial and time barriers to innovation. For example, Heller and 
Eisenberg (1998) argue that in the pharmaceutical industry’s strong IP laws hinders the 
innovation of new drugs. Often, there are many components to a new medication, many of which 
are protected by IP law. As such, researchers must get permission to use these components to 
create new pharmaceuticals, which is costly in both time and money (Heller and Einsenberg, 
1998). IP regulations therefore, make it more difficult to innovate in the pharmaceutical sector 
due to cost and time barriers that IP exposes them too.  
The theoretical lineage of the protectionist view can be attributed to Garrett Hardin 
(1968) and Harold Demsetz (1967). These scholars argue that private property rights are required 
to prevent the over-usage and free-riding of resources (Demsetz 1967; Hardin 1968; Lemley 
2004). Increasingly the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government have taken 
this view on IP. Policy makers can see this by the increasing trend of stronger intellectual 
property rights through international organizations such as the WIPO and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Both organizations have specific rules and procedures for the creation and 
protection of IP. In the 1986-1994 WTO Uruguay negotiations, member countries negotiated the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (WTO, 2016). 
This agreement gives the creator of intellectual property “the right to prevent others from using 
their inventions, designs or other creations and to use that right to negotiate payment in return for 
others using them” (WTO, 2016, p.1). This agreement has expanded IP from a domestic to an 
international scope in that a creator operating in different countries can bring their IP disputes to 
an international body for resolution.  
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Plant Breeders Rights 
Plant breeder rights (PBRs) are a form of intellectual property designed to exclude 
competitors and producers from using the creator's products without consent.  Canadian PBRs 
are framed under the weaker form of IP in that there is a regulated timeframe at which time PBR 
expires. There are then reproducibility exemptions for farmers and researchers that enable 
producers to save harvested certified seed and plant it in following years without paying a 
royalty (Plant Breeders Rights Act, 1990). Reproducibility also grounds farmer exemptions, such 
that farmers can save harvested seed and is royalty free.  
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), “with the grant of a PBR for a new plant 
variety, the holder of PBR obtains exclusive rights in relation to the propagating material of their 
variety. The holder is then able to protect the variety from exploitation by others and can take 
legal action against individuals or companies that are conducting acts, without permission, that is 
the exclusive rights of the holder" (CFIA, 2016, p.1). The goal of these rights is to expand 
innovation in the plant breeding sector and like other forms of IP, provides specific policy tools 
to ensure these rights function properly.  
 In Canada, PBR is governed by the Plant Breeder's Rights Act (1990), which provides 
specific rules and regulation surrounding these rights. To qualify a variety must be new and have 
distinguishable, stable characteristics, and uniform characteristics (Plant Breeders Rights Act, 
1990, s.4). This Act provides a specific definition of what these PBR qualifications mean. To be 
considered a new variety under this act “the propagating or harvested material of that variety has 
not been sold by, or with the concurrence of, the breeder of that variety or the breeder’s legal 
representative” (Plant Breeders Rights Act, 1990.s.4(3)). This guarantees that only the creator of 
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the variety can apply for a PBR and protects against theft of this IP from competing individuals 
and firms.  
A distinguishable characteristic is defined as having “one or more identifiable 
characteristics, clearly distinguishable from all varieties whose existence is a matter of common 
knowledge at the filing date of the application for the grant of plant breeder’s rights respecting 
that plant variety” (Plant Breeders Rights Act, 1990 s.4(2)). This clause ensures that a protected 
variety has new characteristics and protects identifiable features of the previously created plant 
being registered by someone other than the creators.  
To have stable plant characteristics "a variety must remain true to its description over 
successive generations. The variety must be stable in its essential characteristics to the degree 
where further generations of seed or another propagating material exhibit the same 
characteristics of the variety as described in the variety description" (CFIA, 2016, p.3). This 
ensures plant characteristics are identical in subsequent generations. To be uniform “a variety 
must be sufficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics, subject to the variation that may be 
expected from the particular features of its propagation. Any variation should be predictable to 
the extent that it can be described by the breeder, and should be commercially acceptable” 
(CFIA, 2016, p.3). This ensures that when producers purchase a protected variety all seeds have 
identical characteristics for which they paid. 
 
UPOV 91 
The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant is an international IP 
agreement that allows individuals to protect under the law the unique properties that a new plant 
variety exhibits. There have been various versions of this act, the first one being in 1968, 
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followed by the 1972, 1978, and 1991 agreements (UPOV 91, 1991). Each Act has various 
amendments to strengthen plant breeder’s rights. Per UPOV, this act exists “to provide and 
promote an effective system of plant variety protection, with the aim of encouraging the 
development of new varieties of plants, for the benefit of society” (UPOV 91, 1991, p.2). This 
international agreement encourages institutions to increase funding to the research and 
development of new plant varieties. UPOV encourages investment in the same way other forms 
of IP do in that it allows owners to exclude others from using their property without consent 
from the IP holder. The number of plant varieties protected post-UPOV 91 has been used as a 
measurement to quantify the international plant breeder’s agreement success (Jordens and 
Buttons, 2011). This study concluded that UPOV 91 has been successful in encouraging the 
development of new plant varieties in Europe, North America, Asia, Latin America, the Middle 
East and Africa because there has been an increase in domestic and international plant breeding 
application filed in these areas of the world (Jordens and Buttons, 2011). Various clauses in the 
act help to achieve the success of UPOV internationally and domestically.  
Under this agreement, a registered variety can be protected for 20 years and trees and 
vines can be protected for 25 years (Jordens and Buttons, 2011, P.76). This provides variety 
owners time to collect a return on their research and development investment. Variety owners 
can collect damages on “materials obtained through the unauthorized use of propagating 
material” (Jordens and Buttons, 2011, p.76). This section would help alleviate the free-rider 
problem that has plagued the creation of plant breeding in the past. With non-varieties, farmers 
can use and sell seed that was generated from the previous year’s crop, with the caveat that 
producers are prohibited from using the variety name when marketing the seed to other 
producers for planting purposes. This is a problem for varieties owners because they only get 
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paid for the first year that their seeds are grown and do not get compensated when producers 
replant crops with saved seed. Under UPOV 78, a royalty is to be paid by the producer when 
they buy Certified Seed. This gives the owner of Certified Seed more than one chance at 
collecting royalties from the use of their product. Institutions would be more likely to fund new 
seed research and development if they can collect royalties in situations that did not allow them 
to collect under the current checkoff based plant breeding model.  
2-2. Comparison of UPOV 1978 Act and UPOV 1991 Act 
Subject UPOV 1978 Act UPOV 1991 Act 
Minimum scope 
of coverage 
Increasing number of genera or 
species required to be protected, from 
five at time of accession, to 24 eight 
years later. 
Increasing number of genera or species required to 
be protected, from 15 at time of accession, to all 
genera and species 10 years later (5 years for 
member states of earlier UPOV Act). 
Eligibility 
Requirements 
Novelty, distinctness, uniformity and 
stability. 
Novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability. 
Minimum 
exclusive rights in 
propagating 
material 
Production for purposes of 
commercial marketing; offering for 
sale; marketing; repeated use for the 
commercial production of another 
variety. 
Production or reproduction; conditioning for the 
purposes of propagation; offering for sale; selling or 
other marketing; exporting; importing or stocking 
for any of these purposes. 
Minimum 
exclusive rights in 
harvested material 
No such obligation, except for 
ornamental plants used for 
commercial propagating purposes. 
Same acts as above if harvested material obtained 
through unauthorized use of propagating material 
and if breeder had no reasonable opportunity to 
exercise his or her right in relation to the 
propagating material. 
Prohibition on 
dual protection 
with patent 
Yes, for same botanical genus or 
species. 
No. 
Breeders’ 
exemption 
Mandatory. Breeders free to use 
protected variety to develop a new 
variety. 
Permissive, but breeding and exploitation of new 
variety "essentially derived" from earlier variety 
require right holder’s authorization. 
Farmers’ privilege Implicitly allowed under the 
definition of minimum exclusive 
rights. 
Allowed at the option of the member state within 
reasonable limits and subject to safeguarding the 
legitimate interests of the right holder. 
Minimum term of 
protection 
18 years for grapevines and trees;  
15 years for all other plants. 
25 years for grapevines and trees;  
20 years for all other plants. 
Source: L.R. Helfer, 2004, Intellectual property rights in plant varieties: International legal regimes and policy 
options for national governments (FAO). http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5714e/y5714e03.htm#bm3. 
 
According to the Canadian Seed Growers Association (CSGA), Certified Seed must 
conform to specific production processes that ensure that the traits developed by the breeder 
remain in successive generations of the seed (CSGA, 2017, p.1). There are three areas to this 
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production process: varietal purity, germination, and freedom of impurities (CSGA, 2017, p.1). 
Varietal purity ensures that Certified Seed has not been contaminated with any other seed during 
the production process (CSGA, 2017, p.1). The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), 
ensures that all Certified Seed exhibit varietal purity and that germination is of Certified level 
(CSGA, 2017, p.1). Freedom of impurity is intended to assure that Certified Seeds have been 
developed according to regulations in the Seed Act and verified by a third-party inspector 
(CSGA, 2017, p1). Non-Certified Seed are those varieties not developed under Seed Act 
regulations. 
 
Plant Breeding Models 
There are various plant breeding institutional frameworks. In Canada, new canola 
varieties are bred under a private sector model and lentils are breed under a public-private-
producer framework (P4). In Australia on the other hand, wheat is breed by privately owned 
companies, which are financed by an EPR. In Canada, canola is largely breed by multi-national 
organizations. These corporations also breed other commodities such as corn, soybeans, and 
cotton. Lentils in Canada are bred under a P4 framework, which includes producers, 
Saskatchewan Pulse Growers producer association, and the Crop Development Centre at the 
University of Saskatchewan. Currently, lentil breeding at the CDC is also funded by BASF 
(lentils), the Government of Saskatchewan through two research chairs in pea breeding and pulse 
pathology, operational support for field and grain quality screening, and the University of 
Saskatchewan for research and field infrastructure support and royalty investment into breeding. 
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Pulse Breeding in Saskatchewan 
 
The University of Saskatchewan Crop Development Centre (CDC) (wholly-owned by the 
University of Saskatchewan) pulse breeding program began when Dr. Albert Slinkard was hired 
in 1972, and in 1978, the CDC released their inaugural lentil variety (Laird). In 1991, the CDC 
hired Dr. Bert Vandenberg and he began to use hybrid techniques to develop new pulse varieties. 
These events initiated a pulse breeding model in Saskatchewan which resulted from a market 
failure in pulse breeding to generate enough royalty revenue. Also, the model resulted from 
CDC’s goal to provide pulse seed at cheaper cost and to provide momentum to the infant 
Saskatchewan pulse breeding industry. SPG was created in 1984 (CDC lentils varieties were 
already on the market) and in 1997 they formed a pulse breeding partnership.  
In Saskatchewan, lentil variety development is currently supported under a public-private-
producers-partnership; producer funds are from a producer levy on the sale of pulse crop.  The 
University of Saskatchewan Crop Development Centre, conducts the physical research and 
development of new pulse varieties. These lentil producers pay a checkoff of 0.67% of the gross 
value of pulse sales to the producer association (SPG 2016). Checkoffs have not paid for the full 
cost of lentil variety development, whereas EPRs will supposedly cover the entire cost. Along 
with funding the research and development of new pulse varieties, farmers fund other SPG 
activities including pulse market expansions and development. This system also has flaws, one 
issue being freeriding on CDC varieties by producers in other provinces. Supporters of IP cite 
this problem as one reason why strong property rights are warranted. Under this system, 
producers in other provinces benefit from the investment pulse producers and other parties in 
CDC pulse varieties, yet do not financially contribute to the research and development of these 
varieties.  
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Australian Wheat Breeding 
 
Alston and Gray (2013) and Alston, Gray and Bolek (2013) concluded that wheat 
breeding in Australia was plagued by under investment. To fix this problem, the Australian 
government legislated that wheat breeders could charge an EPR and a producer levy on all their 
protected wheat varieties (Alston and Gray, 2013, Alston, Gray, and Bolek, 2013). Both systems 
have been successful in generating new funding for the creation of new wheat varieties in 
Australia. These levies are collected by various research and development corporations (RDC), 
the largest being the Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC) (Gray and Alston, 
2013).  
After Australia signed onto the UPOV 91 agreement they could introduce legislation that 
conformed to international plant breeding IP standards, including EPRs. Thus, the GRDC 
discontinued their financial support of public wheat breeding frameworks and created a tender 
for the creation a three-private wheat breeding institutions. These companies are funded by an 
EPR, the Government R & D Corporation (GRDC), other public institutions, universities, and 
various private sources (Gray, Kingwell, Galushko, and Bolek, 2017, p.14). This is currently the 
dominant mechanism for Australian wheat breeding (Gray and Alston, 2013, p.32; Alston, Gray 
and Bolek, 2013, p.23). Although this system has been successful in attracting foreign and 
domestic investment in Australian wheat breeding, EPR plant breeding funding comes at a cost. 
EPR have created a toll good industry, "which is an industry that has inherent economies of size 
and barriers to entry, with incentives for market concentration and potential for monopoly 
pricing” and thus, prices for varieties produced by this system have been increasing (Gray and 
Alston, 2013, p.32). Thus, producers are susceptible to pay higher prices for seed compared to 
other Australian wheat breeders or Saskatchewan pulse breeding public, private, and levy based 
		 15 
systems but benefit from not being underfunded which could, therefore, produce superior 
varieties, relative to the underfunded levy based systems. 
When the new EPR based Australian wheat breeding framework came into effect the 
corporation could not charge sufficient ERP immediately. 
[W]hen EPRs were first introduced, new EPR varieties had to compete with royalty-free 
varieties already used on farms. The availability of free varieties made it difficult to 
charge a significant EPR on the new varieties until they had improved to the point where 
producers were willing to pay a significant amount of EPR to access them (Alston, Gray, 
Bolek, 2012, p.25). 
 
If the corporations charged significant EPRs early on, producers would have likely not 
purchased seed from these firms, because free seed could be sourced from public sources. Once 
crop yields on EPR-funded varieties improved, it made financial sense for them to purchase 
higher priced seed. With new PBRs in effect, it remains to be seen if they will incentivize private 
sector involvement in pulse breeding, and how they use EPRs to fund breeding, whether 
increased funding will lead to superior pulse varieties, whether an EPR/toll-good like pulse 
breeding framework will lead to high pulse seed prices and which frameworks SPG checkoff 
based or EPR based breeding will succeed?  
According to Steve Jefferies, the former CEO of Australian Grain Technologies (AGT, 
the largest wheat breeder in Australia), EPR have changed Australian wheat breeding (Gray, 
Kingwell, Galushko, and Bolek, 2017, p.14). Before 2000, $18 million per year was invested in 
wheat breeding, 98% of which came from the public institutions. In 2015 under an EPR system, 
a $45 million per year was invested in wheat breeding, virtually of it coming from private 
sources (Gray, Kingwell, Galushko, and Bolek, 2017, p.14). Currently, the EPR Australian wheat 
breeding system operates 250,000 crop yield plots, whereas Canada operating under a non-EPR 
plant breeding system currently operates 80,000 plots (Gray, Kingwell, Galushko, and Bolek, 
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2017, p.14). This indicates that more wheat breeding is being conducted in Australia under their 
EPR system than in Canada under a public system. More research into wheat breeding in 
Australia has led to higher yielding wheat varieties than compared to varieties financed under 
any other system.  Jefferies also indicated that wheat varieties Mace and Scepter, produced by 
AGT in 2008, on average yielded 3% and 7% higher than any other variety (Gray, Kingwell, 
Galushko, and Bolek, 2017, p.14) EPRs has led to greater revenue for wheat breeders in 
Australia, which consequently led to superior yielding wheat varieties.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Prospect Theory 
In 1981 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky wrote the seminal paper in the field of 
behavioral economics. They developed a theory that challenged von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s (1947) rational model of decision making that individuals will chose the option 
that yields the highest expected utility. They argued that when making decisions humans have 
specific heuristic biases that will cause them to make the irrational decision (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Specifically, individuals make an irrational decision when they are presented 
with risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). They called this system prospect theory and found that 
humans are risk-averse when making decisions when framed in the positive and risk-seeking in 
the negative (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  The phenomena of these “outcomes are commonly 
perceived as positive or negative in relation to a reference outcome that is judged neutrally. 
Variations of the reference point can, therefore, determine whether a given outcome is evaluated 
as a gain or as a loss" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981, p.456). There have been many attempts to 
replicate the results of Kahneman and Tversky’s 1981 “Asian Disease Problem” with varying 
		 17 
results (e.g. Levin et al, 1998; Duckman 2001; Lubieniechi et al, 2016). A pair of meta-analyses 
(Kuhberger 1998; Pinon and Gambara 2005) concluded that although this study continues to see 
risk-averse behavior in the positive and risk-seeking in the negative when Kahneman and 
Tversky’s experiment has been replicated, the results are small (Lubieniechi et al, 2016, p.725).  
 
The Asian Disease Problem 
 Kahneman and Tversky’s (1981) Asian disease problem explained the effect of framing 
in risky situations. In this experiment, Kahneman and Tversky presented this survey to 
respondents in their classical fashion; first, they presented a problem and then provided two 
options to solve the problem; one that is framed as a loss and one framed as a gain. In this 
experiment, the authors created a fictitious scenario where there is an outbreak of an Asia 
Disease in the US and 600 people are expected to die. They described the scenario as follows:  
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed that are of equal expected utility. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of 
the consequences of the programs is as follows:  
 
Option #1:  
If Program A is adopted; 200 people will be saved.  
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved 
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
 
Option #2: 
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die.  
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981, p.453).  
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3-1. Structure of the Asian Disease Problem 
Frame Choice Option Consequence Expected Value Study results (% 
of respondents) 
Positive Prospect A 
Prospect B 
200 saved 
(1/3) 600 saved 
200 saved (400 dead) 
200 saved (400 dead) 
72% 
28% 
Negative Prospect C 
Prospect D 
400 die 
(2/3) 600 die 
400 dead (200 saved) 
400 dead (200 saved) 
22% 
78% 
Lubieniechi, Hesseln, Phillips, Smyth, 2016, p.721 
 
Both options have identical expected values, the difference between the two choices is 
that option #1 is framed as a gain (people being saved) and option #2 is framed as a loss (people 
dying). The result in the positive domain had 72% choosing the risk-averse options (prospect A) 
and 28% choosing the risk-seeking option (Prospect B) and in the negative domain, 22% chose 
the risk-averse option (Prospect C) and 78% chose the risk-seeking option (Prospect D) 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1981). This experiment suggests that humans are risk-averse in the 
domain of gain and risk-seeking in the domain of loss because when the option was framed as 
gain respondents choose the risk-averse option and under the domain of loss they choose the 
risk-seeking option. This supports that there is a heuristic bias surrounding risk and framing. 
Even though the expected values are equal, people make irrational decisions when choices are 
framed differently. 
 
Limitations to Prospect Theory 
Although prospect theory has been influential in predicting human decision making in 
risky situations it has situational limitations. Druckman (2001), List (2003, 2004, and 2011) and 
Lubieniechi et al, (2016) argue that results can change when experiments are taken into real 
market situations instead of theoretical experimental settings. Druckman (2001), List (2003, 
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2004, 2011) and Lubieniechi et al, (2016) have concluded through behavioral experiments that 
the prospect theory works when an experiment is given to individuals with limited market 
experience but when the same experiment is given to individuals with market experience, they 
tend to choose the option with the highest expected utility. This limitation could affect this 
experimental test of Saskatchewan pulse growers. This study is attempting to see if Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1979, 1981) experiments are valid when testing pulse growers and their level of 
cognitive bias surrounding gains and losses in risky situations. The experienced farmers’ sample 
could skew this study’s prospect theory experimental results. 
 
4.  Experimental Design 
This research focused on cognitive biases that affect Canadian pulse farmer decision 
making. More specifically this research studied how pulse farmers’ decisions change when 
options are framed as a loss and as a gain in risky situations and determined farmer’s provenance 
preferences. This study used the same experimental framework Kahneman and Tversky used in 
their famous Asian Disease Problem, except this research performed the experiment in the 
context of pulse producers and their willingness to purchase lentil seeds developed under 
checkoffs and an EPR system. This study created an experiment that tests framing and farmer 
seed preferences based on provenance. There were two versions of the behavioral experiment. 
Respondents got two questions; the questions were allocated in such a way that respondents got a 
question related to check off and one related to EPR and the questions were further differentiated 
by one in the gain domain and one in the loss domain. To answer this thesis’ problem statement 
this study tests three hypotheses. These hypotheses have been tested many times. Lubieniechi et 
al. (2016) also tested them against framing and provenance and one key conclusion they reached 
		 20 
was “while framing has a strong impact on all participants’ choices, there is a weak and 
inconsistent provenance effect across results” (Lubieniechi et al, 2016, p.743), which violates 
expected utility theory.  
This study used the experiment to test these three hypotheses: 
• H01” The rate of choice will be 50% for each of Prospects A and B” (Lubieniechi et al, 
2016, p.743). 
• H02 “H01 will hold for the positively framed and the negatively framed sets of Prospects 
A and B” (Lubieniechi et al, 2016, p.743).  
• H1: A choice shift between the positive and negative framing will be observed such that 
risk aversion is more strongly induced by the positive condition than risk-seeking is 
induced by the negative condition (Lubieniechi et al, 2016, p.722). 
In expected utility, if two options have the same expected utility then there should be a 
50% chance to choose prospect A and 50% chance to choose prospect B (Lubieniechi, et al, 
2016, p.721, Von Neumann and Morgenstern,1947). If these null hypotheses are valid, then 
framing should have no impact on which option respondents choose. Likewise, provenance 
should also have no impact on the results of this experiment since expected utility is the sole 
determinate. This study will test H01 against the 50/50 expected utility model and against 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) conclusions. These hypotheses will allow this study to test the 
results of Kahneman and Tversky (1981) and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947).  
 Kahneman and Tversky (1981), conclude that people are risk-averse in the positive/gain 
domain and risk-seeking in the negative/loss domain. This result is consistent with that of a 
choice reversal, in which significantly more than 50% of respondents chose in the risk-averse the 
positive, and significantly less than 50% of respondents chose the risk-seeking in the negative 
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(Lubieniechi et al, 2016, p.721, Druckman, 2001). However, most studies that replicated a 
version of the Asian Disease Problem yielded a choice shift, rather than a choice reversal 
(Lubieniechi et al, 2016). A choice shift occurs “when the rate of choice for Prospects A and B 
differs across the positively and negatively framed problems but a choice reversal is not 
observed” (Lubieniechi et al, 2016, p.722, Levin, 1998). This study created a prospect theory 
experiment to determine the number of risk-seekers and risk avoiders to determine if a choice 
shift or a choice reversal will be observed. 
To examine these hypothesizes this study conducted the following prospect theory 
experiment. This study presented a prospect theory experiment to Western Canadian pulse 
farmers in which they need to choose between two different pulse varieties each with different 
yield potentials. This study framed one question as a gain and the other as loss and they were 
further differentiated by provenance. This will determine the validity of Ho1 and Ho2 and H1 and 
determine if pulse producers have a bias towards a specific provenance.  
 
4-1. Structure of the Lentil Variety Problem (Target yield 25 bu/a) 
Provenance Frame Choice 
Option 
Consequence Expected Value Study results (% 
of respondents) 
Checkoff 
 
 
 
Positive 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
Variety A 
Variety B  
 
Variety A 
Variety B 
All fields yield 20 bu/a 
1/4 fields yield 32 bu/a  
3/4 fields yield 16 bu/a  
All fields yield 5 bus < target  
1/4 fields yield 7 bus > target  
3/4 fields yield 9 bus < target  
20 bu/ac gain 
20 bu/ac gain 
 
20 bu/ac gain 
20 bu/ac gain 
 
59%  
41%  
 
66%  
34%  
EPR 
 
Positive 
 
 
Negative 
 
Variety C 
Variety D 
 
Variety C 
Variety D 
 
All fields yield 20 bu/a 
1/4 fields yield 32 bus/a 
3/4 fields yield 16 bus/a 
All fields yield 5 bus < target  
1/4 fields yield 7 bus > target  
3/4 fields yield 9 bus < target 
20 bu/ac gain 
20 bu/ac gain  
 
20 bu/ac gain 
20 bu/ac gain 
 
59%  
41%  
 
53%  
47%  
 
 
To determine which provenance (public checkoff or EPR) pulse producers prefer, this study 
asked respondents how strongly they prefer different pulse variety funding mechanisms (royalty 
		 22 
embedded in seed price, the royalty paid through contract technology use agreements, mandatory 
checkoff, voluntary/refundable checkoff, EPRs). This study also created a 2 X 2 table to express 
the percentage of risk-averse and risk-seekers in both frames. The study asked various 
demographic and business related questions, farmer provenance preference by crop type (pulses, 
cereals, oil seeds) and where farmers get information and advice on crop and how they feel about 
stacked varieties (Appendix A). A cross-tabulation was conducted between the 2 X 2 risk-averse 
versus risk-seeking table and the demographic and business related questions. A one-way 
ANOVA was also performed to see if there is a difference between pulses, cereals, and oilseeds 
as they relate to changing provenance. This offers insight into who these risk-averse and risk-
seekers are and who and what influences their seed choice decisions. 
This study surveyed members of the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association 
(WCWGA), the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers Association (SPG) and producers at the Western 
Canadian Crop Production Show. This study surveyed WCWGA and SPG members online via 
the Voxco software available through the Social Science Research Laboratory at the University 
of Saskatchewan. Producers surveyed at the Crop Production show in Saskatoon were surveyed 
via hard copy. This study used the hard copy method at least partly in response to a concern that 
less technological savvy producers might decline to participate in an online survey, and partly to 
avoid technical challenges arising from limited public Wi-Fi service at the Crop Production 
Show (which ended up being the case). Respondents at the Crop Production Show were given a 
$5 Tim Hortons gift card as a thank you for their participation. This survey was approved on 
October 12, 2016, by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioral Ethics Board (BEH 16-332). 
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5. Results 
Demographics 
In total, this questionnaire was filled out by 127 farmers, 33 completed it online via the 
Voxco online software and the remaining were completed by hardcopy at the Western Canadian 
Crop Production Show in Saskatoon, from January 8th to 11th, 2017. The total number of acres 
these farmers seeded in 2016 ranged from 300 to 20,000. The mean amount seeded in 2016 was 
5182 acres. This survey concluded that 83% of respondents have grown pulses within the last 5 
years. In 2016, 34% of respondents seeded lentils, 50% seeded peas, 16% seeded chickpeas, 8% 
seeded fababeans and 5% seeded dry beans. This study also calculated the mean number of 
acres’ respondents grew of each pulse crop in 2016 (5-1.). 
 
 
 
 
This study included 7% respondents from Alberta, 84% from Saskatchewan, 8% from 
Manitoba, and 0.8% from elsewhere. On average, farmers in the sample had been farming for 21 
years. Overall, an overwhelming majority of respondents currently farm in Saskatchewan and are 
pulse producers. The average respondent also seeded a sizeable number of acres and had 
considerable farm experience.  
 
5-1. Mean Number of Acres Seeded in 2016 
 Mean Acres Planted N 
Lentils 1514 43 
Peas 670 64 
Chickpeas 2500 2 
Fababeans 273 10 
Dry Beans 308 7 
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Provenance Preference by Commodity 
This study directly asked farmers which seed pricing mechanism they preferred for 
pulses, cereals, and oilseeds. Provenances included in this question were: royalties imbedded in 
seed price, royalties paid by technology use agreements, mandatory checkoffs, voluntary 
checkoffs, and EPRs. The composite and mean scores of each crop type are similar, suggesting 
there is not a strong preference for specific provenance within a crop type or between crop types. 
 
5-2.  Producer Provenance Preferences – Pulses Crops (binned) 
 Strongly/Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately/Strongly 
For 
Composite Score 196 
(32%) 
200 
(33%) 
218 
(35%) 
Royalty imbedded in seed 
price 
35 
(28%) 
34 
(28%) 
54 
(44%) 
Royalty paid through 
contract technology use 
agreements 
43 
(35%) 
41 
(34%) 
37 
(31%) 
Mandatory checkoff 47 
(38%) 
40 
(32%) 
36 
(29%) 
Voluntary/refundable 
checkoff 
28 
(22%) 
40 
(32%) 
57 
(46%) 
End-point royalties 43 
(35%) 
45 
(37%) 
34 
(28%) 
 
 The composite scores for those respondents that are for, indifferent, and against specific 
provenances in pulse breeding and similar, indicating that roughly the same number of farmers 
fall in these three categories regardless of funding mechanism.  
5-3. Pulse Provenance Preference - Mean Mean N 
Royalty imbedded in seed price 3.11 123 
Royalty paid through contract technology use agreements 2.82 121 
Mandatory checkoff 2.8 123 
Voluntary/refundable checkoff 3.22 125 
End-point royalties 2.83 122 
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The mean score of different funding mechanism for pulse crops are similar, indicating 
that there is very little difference between producer preferences in pulse breeding. 
5-4. Producer Provenance Preferences – Cereals (binned) 
 Strongly/Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately/Strongly 
For 
Composite Score 200 
(33%) 
195 
(32%) 
210 
(35%) 
Royalty imbedded in seed 
price 
41 
(34%) 
35 
(29%) 
45 
(37%) 
Royalty paid through 
contract technology use 
agreements 
48 
(40%) 
43 
(36%) 
28 
(23%) 
Mandatory checkoff 46 
(37%) 
39 
(32%) 
38 
(31%) 
Voluntary/refundable 
checkoff 
26 
(21%) 
34 
(28%) 
63 
(51%) 
End-point royalties 39 
(33%) 
44 
(37%) 
36 
(30%) 
 
Like pulse crops, the composite score of provenance preference in cereals are similar, 
which indicated that there are similar numbers of producers that fall into these three categories.  
 
5-5. Cereal Provenance Preference Mean Mean N 
Royalty imbedded in seed price 2.99 121 
Royalty paid through contract technology use agreements 2.66 119 
Mandatory checkoff 2.88 123 
Voluntary/refundable checkoff 3.33 123 
End-point royalties 2.94 119 
 
The mean score of provenance preference in cereals are similar indicating that there is 
little difference between these funding mechanism preferences as they relate to cereals.  
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5-6. Producer Provenance Preferences – Oil Seeds (binned) 
 Strongly/Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately/Strongly 
For 
Composite Score 199 
(33%) 
194 
(32%) 
212 
(35%) 
Royalty imbedded in seed price 40 
(33%) 
34 
(23%) 
46 
(38%) 
Royalty paid through contract 
technology use agreements 
45 
(37%) 
44 
(37%) 
31 
(26%) 
Mandatory checkoff 46 
(37%) 
35 
(28%) 
42 
(34%) 
Voluntary/refundable checkoff 28 
(23%) 
39 
(32%) 
56 
(45%) 
End-point royalties 40 
(34%) 
42 
(35%) 
37 
(31%) 
 
The composite scores of producer provenance preferences with oilseeds are similar, 
indicating that there is little difference in the number of farmers that fall into these categories.  
 
5-7.  Oil Seed Provenance Preference - Mean Mean N 
Royalty imbedded in seed price 2.97 120 
Royalty paid through contract technology use agreements 2.75 120 
Mandatory checkoff 2.89 123 
Voluntary/refundable checkoff 3.23 123 
End-point royalties 2.93 119 
 
 The mean score of oil seed provenance preferences are similar, indicating that there little 
different between these funding mechanisms and producer preference.  
 
Behavioral Experiment Results 
This study concluded that when checkoff financed lentil varieties are framed as a gain, pulse 
producers chose the risk-averse variety 59% of the time and the risk-seeking variety 41% of the 
time. When checkoff varieties are framed as a loss, pulse producers are likely to choose the 
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riskless variety 66% of the time and the risky 34% of the time. Therefore, Kahneman and 
Tversky’s hypothesis that humans are risk-averse in the domain of gain is not rejected and the 
hypothesis that individuals are risk-seeking in the domain of loss is rejected. When EPR financed 
varieties are framed as a gain pulse producers are likely to choose the riskless option 53% of the 
time and the risky option 47% of the time. When EPR financed varieties are framed as a loss, 
pulse producers are likely to choose the risk-averse option 59% of the time and the risk-seeking 
option 41% of the time. Therefore, Kahneman and Tversky’s hypothesis that humans are risk-
averse in the domain of gain is not rejected and their hypothesis that humans are risk-seeking in 
the domain of loss is rejected. 
 
5-8.  Behavioral Experiment Results 
Provenance Frame Preference 
Checkoff Positive A = 59% (39)  B = 41% (27) 
EPR Positive C = 59% (36)  D = 41% (25) 
Checkoff Negative A= 66%  (40)  B = 34% (21) 
EPR Negative C = 53% (35)  D = 47% (31) 
*A and C = risk-averse; B and D = risk-seeking 
 
Under a positive framing, when producers were given the choice between EPR and 
checkoff financed lentil varieties, most producers choose the riskless option in both instances 
when the problem was framed as a gain. For EPR funded lentil varieties producers preferred the 
riskless (59%) option over the risky (41%) option. For checkoffs funded lentil varieties, 
producers also preferred the riskless (59%) option over the risky (41%) in the domain of gain. 
Under a negative framing, when producers were given the choice between EPR and checkoff 
varieties many producers chose the riskless option when these choices were framed as a loss. In 
the domain of loss, for EPR funded lentil varieties producers prefer the riskless (53%) option 
		 28 
over the risky (47%) option. For checkoff-funded lentil varieties producers prefer the riskless 
(66%) option over the risky option (34%). The results suggest that regardless of whether a lentil 
variety was financed by checkoffs or an EPR or if the problem was framed in the positive or 
negative, most producers in every scenario chose the riskless. 
 
Information and Advice on Crop Choices 
This study asked respondents “where do you get information and advice on crop 
choices.” According to the responses, pulse producers are more likely to get information and 
advice on crop choices from personal experience (82%), agronomists (51%), family (53%), and 
agri-business (43%). They never or only occasionally get information from the media (53%) and 
the internet (38%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These results reveal that pulse producers prefer to get information and advice on crop 
choices directly from experience or other individuals directly instead of through a medium. 
Perhaps, producers prefer direct in person contact when gathering information on crop choices 
instead non-in person technologically mediated contact and that traditional forms of information 
gathering for decision making still dominate. 
5-9. Information and Advice on Crop Choices (Binned responses 1+2, 3, 4+5) 
 Never/Occasionally Sometimes Frequently/Always 
Personal Experience 5 
(4%) 
17 
(14%) 
103 
(82%) 
Family 32 
(26%) 
26 
(21%) 
66 
(53%) 
Agronomists 18 
(14%) 
43 
(34%) 
64 
(51%) 
Agri-Business Companies 22 
(18%) 
48 
(39%) 
54 
(43%) 
Internet 46 
(38%) 
40 
(33%) 
34 
(23%) 
Media 62 
(53%) 
43 
(37%) 
12 
(10%) 
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6. Analysis 
 
Results 1: Behavioral Experiment Analysis 
In this problem, farmers were given a choice, one of which was risk-averse and the other 
risk-seeking between two lentil varieties. The problems were further manipulated by provenance 
(checkoff and EPR) and framing (positive and negative).  
 
Checkoff 
 The null hypothesis H01 failed to be rejected (p = 0.14) in the domain of gain with a p-
value greater than 0.05 with 98% confidence, but was rejected in the domain of loss with a p-
value of 0.015. Although, H01 failed to be rejected in the domain of gain, it was rejected in the 
domain of loss, therefore H02 is rejected. This means that framing does influence farmer decision 
making under checkoff manipulations, but only in the domain of loss. Hypothesis H1 could not 
be rejected for both positively and negatively framed choices, therefore a choice shift was 
observed. In the positive 59% of farmers chose the riskless option while in the negative 66% of 
respondents also chose the riskless option. The choice shift was weak in that there was only a 7% 
shift. When the results of the problem were compared to Kahneman and Tversky’s “Asian 
Disease Problem” the results differed significantly, with p-values of less than .05.  
6-1. Wald Chi Square Comparison of Positively Framed Checkoff Outcomes Against H01 
 Variety A Variety B 
Observed Distribution 39 (59%) 27 (41%) 
Expected Distribution 33 (50%) 33 (50%) 
Wald Chi Square Result χ2 (1) = 2.182, p = .014 
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6-2. Wald Chi Square Comparison of Negatively Framed Checkoff Outcomes Against H01 
 Variety A Variety B 
Observed Distribution 40 (66%) 21 (34%) 
Expected Distribution 30 (50%) 30 (50%) 
Wald Chi Square Result: χ2 (1) = 5.918, p = 0.015 
 
6-3. Wald Chi Square Comparison of Positively Framed Checkoff Outcomes Against the 
“Asian Disease” Results 
 Variety A Variety B 
Observed Distribution 39 (59%) 27 (41%) 
Expected Distribution 47 (72%) 18 (28%) 
Wald Chi Square Result: X2 (1) = 5.456, p = 0.02 
 
6-4. Wald Chi Square of Comparison of Negatively Framed Checkoff Outcomes Against 
the “Asian Disease” Results 
 Variety A Variety B 
Observed Distribution 40 (66%) 21 (34%) 
Expected Distribution 13 (22%) 48 (78%) 
Wald Chi Square Results: X2 (1) = 67.494, p = <0.001 
 
End-Point-Royalty 
 The null hypothesis H01 and H02 failed to be rejected in the domain of loss (p = .622) and 
gain (0.159) with a p-value greater than .05. This means that framing under an EPR manipulation 
does not affect pulse producer decision making. Hypothesis H1 could not be rejected under 
positive and negative framing. In the negative, 53% of respondents chose the risk- adverse option 
and in the positive, 59% of respondents chose the risk-averse option in the negative. There was a 
weak choice shift in that there was a shift of 6%. When the results were compared to Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1981) “Asian Disease” problem, the results differed significantly with p-values 
of less than 0.05. 
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6-5. Wald Chi Square Comparison of Negatively Framed EPR Outcomes Against H01 
 Variety C Variety D 
Observed Distribution 35 (53%) 31 (47%) 
Expected Distribution 33 (50%) 33 (50%) 
Wald Chi Square Results: X2 (1) = .242, p = 0.622 
 
6-6. Wald Chi Square Comparison of Positively EPR Outcomes Against H01 
 Variety C Variety D 
Observed Distribution 36 (59%) 25 (41%) 
Expected Distribution 30 (50%) 30 (50%) 
Wald Chi Square Results: X2 (1) = 1.984, p = 0.159 
 
6-7. Wald Chi Square Comparison of Negatively Framed EPR Outcomes Against the 
“Asian Disease” Results 
 Variety C Variety D 
Observed Distribution 35 (53%) 31 (47%) 
Expected Distribution 14 (22%) 51 (78%) 
Wald Chi Square Results: X2 (1) = 37.034, p < 0.001 
 
6-8. Wald Chi Square Comparison of Positively Framed EPR Outcomes Against the 
“Asian Disease” Results 
 Variety C Variety D 
Observed Distribution 36 (59%) 25 (41%) 
Expected Distribution 44 (72%) 17 (28%) 
Wald Chi Square Result: X2 (1) = 5.101, p = 0.024 
 
 
Result 2: Cereal, Oil Seed, and Pulse Funding Preferences  
 
 Producers were asked about their preferences regarding different seed funding 
mechanisms by crop type (pulses, cereals, and oilseeds) and provided with a 5 point Likert scale 
to test their preferences for royalty embedded in seed price, royalty paid through contract 
technology use agreements (TUA), mandatory checkoff, voluntary checkoff, and EPRs. The 
results were binned the responses in 3 categories: strongly/moderately against, indifferent, and 
moderately/strongly for and a mean of each response based on the 5 point Likert scale was 
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calculated. The composite and mean score of provenance preference by crop type revealed that 
there is not a strong preference for any specific mechanism.  
 
Result 3: One Way ANOVA for Mean Cereal, Oil Seed, and Pulse Provenance Preferences 
 
 An ANOVA test was used to test for a difference between pulses, cereals, and oilseeds as 
they relate to different funding mechanism. This test concluded that there is no difference 
between oil seed, cereals, and pulses as they relate to farmer provenance preferences. The 
following composite scores were computed by calculating the average score of the five items 
evaluated for each cereal, oil seeds, and pulse crop on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. Each respondent 
evaluated all three crop types. 
6-9. Provenance by Commodity Composite Score 
Cereal Varieties Oil Seed Varieties Pulse Varieties  
N = 126; Mean = 2.9712 N = 126; Mean = 2.9869 N = 127; Mean = 3.0079 
 
 
One-way ANOVA Results: F (2) = .071, p = .931 
 
ANOVA was not significant (p=0.931), therefore subsequent tests were not conducted. 
The observed means of each crop type do not differ significantly from one another. This suggests 
that respondents may not feel differently about the way funds are raised based on the crop type 
evaluated. 
 
Result 4: Risk Preferences by Framing 
 
 This behavioral experiment was designed to determine if pulse producers exhibit 
cognitive biases surrounding framing and provenance.  In the problem, respondents had the 
ability to choose a risk-averse lentil variety or a risk-seeking variety under framing and 
provenance manipulations.  
		 33 
Table 6-10. identifies those who answered with the same risk versus inconsistent risk 
tolerances depending on the framing of the prospect theory question. The following table reveals 
that 44% of respondents are risk-averse in both frames and 26% are risk-seeking in both frames.  
6-10. Risk Preference by Framing - 2 X 2 
 Negative  
Positive  Risk-averse respondents Risk-seeking respondents 
Risk-averse respondents 56 (44%) 23 (18%) 
Risk-seeking respondents 15 (12%) 33 (26%) 
Total  127 
 
It reveals that 18% exhibit prospect theory behavior in that they are risk-averse in the 
positive/gain domain and risk-seeking in the negative/loss domain while 12% of respondent 
exhibit the opposite behavior. Therefore about 56% of respondents are willing to accept some 
level of risk and about 30% of farmer’s exhibit irrational behavior because they switch their risk 
preference based on framing, when under a rational model total utility should be taken into 
consideration when making decisions. Identifying the number of risk-seekers and what and who 
influences their decisions is important for the adoption of new technology because risk-seekers 
are generally the first adopters of technology and are the influencers that move biotechnology 
and plant breeding forward. In the following section, cross tabulations between the various 
demographic questions identify who and what influences these pulse producers. 
 
Result 5: Risk Tolerance Profiles 
 This study preformed cross-tabulations profiling respondents according to risk 
inclinations irrespective of gain or loss framing and between demographic, provenance 
preference by crop type and where producers are more likely to obtain information and advice on 
seed choice decisions. This study began by cross-tabulating the risk tolerance of these 
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respondents with their demographics. Respondents were binned into three categories based on 
their risk preferences: risk-seekers which includes those farmers that choose the risky option in 
both the positive and negative, riskless, which are those farmers that choose the riskless option in 
both frames, and occasional risky which include respondents that chose the risky option in only 
one frame. Most provenance preferences in each risk profile are marginal, indicating that there is 
a weak preference.  
6-11. Demographic Profiles by Risk Preferences 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Did you Seed Pulse Crops in the Last 5 years? 
Yes 73% 86% 87% 
No 27% 14% 13% 
Province of farm 
Alberta 3% 12% 3.0% 
Saskatchewan 94% 79% 84% 
Manitoba 3.0% 7% 13% 
Other 0% 1.8% 0% 
Total Acres Seeded in 2016? 
1-5000  69% 59% 67% 
5001-10,000  19% 36% 25% 
10,001 - 15,000  3% 0% 6% 
15,001- 20,000 9% 5% 3% 
Lentils (acres) 
1 – 5,000 71% 62% 60% 
1,501 – 3,000 0% 24% 33% 
3,001 – 4,500 0% 5% 0% 
4,501 – 6,000 29% 9% 7% 
Peas (acres)    
1 – 500 38% 47% 58% 
501 – 1000 54% 37% 26% 
1001 – 1500 8% 12% 16% 
1501 – 2000 0% 3.1% 0% 
Years Farming    
1 – 15 50% 49% 47% 
16-30 28.% 24% 19% 
31-45 22% 21% 28% 
 
The survey also asked the respondents where they got their agronomic information. The 
following tables break out the responses by the risk preferences of the respondent. There are a 
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few interesting differences. Generally, risk-seekers rely more on family, agribusiness and the 
media for advice. Risk-averse producers draw from all the identified sources relatively 
consistently.  
 
6-12. Agronomic Information from Family by Risk-Preference  
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Never 6% 9% 13% 
Occasionally 9% 11% 30% 
Sometimes 12% 28% 19% 
Frequently 51% 39% 16% 
Always 21% 13% 22% 
 
6-13. Agronomic Information from Agri-Business by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Never 3% 2% 6% 
Occasionally 9% 12% 22% 
Sometimes 19% 54% 33% 
Frequently 56% 20% 28% 
Always 12% 12% 11% 
 
6-14. Agronomic Information from the Internet by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Never 27% 10% 6% 
Occasionally 24% 29% 20% 
Sometimes 18% 31% 51% 
Frequently 27% 25% 20% 
Always 3% 6% 3% 
 
6-15. Agronomic Information from the Media by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Never 29% 27% 18% 
Occasionally 19% 35% 26% 
Sometimes 35% 29% 50% 
Frequently 13% 10% 3% 
Always 3% 0% 3% 
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6-16. Agronomic Information from Agronomists by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Never 0% 2% 3% 
Occasionally 9% 16% 11% 
Sometimes 36% 36% 30% 
Frequently 39% 36% 49% 
Always 15% 9% 8% 
 
6-17. Agronomic Information from Personal Experience by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Never 3% 0% 3% 
Occasionally 3% 2% 3% 
Sometimes 6% 11% 24% 
Frequently 54% 58% 40% 
Always 33% 29% 30% 
 
6-18. Agronomic Information from Other Farmers by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Never 0% 0% 3% 
Occasionally 6% 7% 11% 
Sometimes 24% 28% 27% 
Frequently 48% 46% 40% 
Always 21% 18% 19% 
 
 This study also broke out the questions about preferences for seed financing mechanisms 
by the risk preferences of the producer respondents. There were no glaring differences among the 
groups and their preferences. Generally, risk-averse producers were more tolerant of all the 
methods. 
6-19. Cereal Varieties Funded by Royalty Imbedded in Seed Price by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 18% 11% 17% 
Moderately Against 18% 19% 20% 
Indifferent 24% 34% 26% 
Moderately For 24% 26% 29% 
Strongly For 15% 9% 9% 
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6-20. Cereal Varieties Funded by TUA by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 19% 15% 23% 
Moderately Against 28% 21% 17% 
Indifferent 34% 42% 29% 
Moderately For 16% 21% 29% 
Strongly For 3% 0% 3% 
 
6-21. Cereal Varieties Funded by Mandatory Checkoff by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 15% 9% 22% 
Moderately Against 27% 24% 17% 
Indifferent 30% 33% 31% 
Moderately For 18% 24% 22% 
Strongly For 9% 9% 8% 
 
6-22. Cereal Varieties Funded by Voluntary Checkoff by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 12% 17% 13% 
Moderately Against 3% 7% 8% 
Indifferent 30% 28% 24% 
Moderately For 36% 32% 32% 
Strongly For 18% 15% 22% 
 
6-23. Cereal Varieties Funded by EPR by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 18% 12% 14% 
Moderately Against 12% 16% 29% 
Indifferent 33% 39% 37% 
Moderately For 21% 22% 14% 
Strongly For 15% 12% 6% 
 
6-24. Oil Seed Varieties Funded by Royalty Embedded in Seed Price by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 19% 15% 17% 
Moderately Against 12% 17% 19% 
Indifferent 19% 35% 28% 
Moderately For 34% 29% 28% 
Strongly For 16% 4% 8% 
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6-25. Oil Seed Varieties Funded by TUA by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 16% 11% 22% 
Moderately Against 29% 21% 17% 
Indifferent 26% 47% 31% 
Moderately For 29% 19% 25% 
Strongly For 0% 2% 6% 
 
6-26. Oil Seed Varieties Funded by Mandatory Checkoff by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 16% 7% 30% 
Moderately Against 25% 26% 11% 
Indifferent 25% 33% 24% 
Moderately For 34% 24% 19% 
Strongly For 0% 9% 16% 
 
6-27.  Oil Seed Varieties Funded by Voluntary Checkoff by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 12% 15% 16% 
Moderately Against 6% 9% 8% 
Indifferent 41% 28% 30% 
Moderately For 31% 35% 24% 
Strongly For 9% 13% 22% 
 
6-28.  Oil Seed Varieties Funded by EPR by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 19% 13% 17% 
Moderately Against 16% 15% 22% 
Indifferent 26% 35% 44% 
Moderately For 23% 27% 6% 
Strongly For 16% 10% 11% 
 
 
 Pulse producers, the focus of this work, warrant a brief discussion. Generally, risk-
seekers and occasional risk takers had wider diffusion of opinions, being both more antagonistic 
and more supported of each method than risk-averse producers.  
  
		 39 
6-29.  Pulse Varieties Funded by Royalty Imbedded in Seed Price by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 21% 13% 16% 
Moderately Against 0% 13% 22% 
Indifferent 15% 40% 22% 
Moderately For 42% 30% 24% 
Strongly For 21% 4% 16% 
 
6-30. Pulse Varieties Funded by TUA by Risk-Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 16% 15% 19% 
Moderately Against 25% 19% 13% 
Indifferent 31% 40% 27% 
Moderately For 25% 23% 35% 
Strongly For 3% 2% 5% 
 
6-31. Pulse Varieties Funded by Mandatory Checkoff by Risk Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 18% 13% 24% 
Moderately Against 27% 19% 16% 
Indifferent 21% 40% 32% 
Moderately For 30% 21% 19% 
Strongly For 3% 7% 8% 
 
6-32.  Pulse Varieties Funded by Voluntary Checkoff by Risk Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 15% 15% 13% 
Moderately Against 9% 6% 10% 
Indifferent 24% 37% 32% 
Moderately For 39% 31% 26% 
Strongly For 12% 11% 18% 
 
6-33.  Pulse Varieties Funded by Voluntary Checkoff by Risk Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Against 27% 15% 16% 
Moderately Against 15% 13% 21% 
Indifferent 24% 40% 43% 
Moderately For 15% 27% 11% 
Strongly For 18% 4% 8% 
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6-34. Pulse Varieties Funded by Stacked Royalty Mechanism by Risk Preference 
 Risk-seeking Risk-averse Occasional Risk 
Strongly Opposed 39% 14% 32% 
Moderately Opposed 24% 29% 16% 
Indifferent 21% 45% 16% 
Moderately Support 15% 12% 3% 
Strongly for 0% 0% 0% 
 
Always Risk-Seeking 
 The respondents in this category are defined as those choosing the risky choice in both 
the positive and negative frames. Of those farmers that are always risk-seeking, 73% are pulse 
producers and 94% of them farm in Saskatchewan. They generally have small farms, with 69% 
seeding between 1 and 5000 acres in 2016. Most seeded between 1 to 5000 acres of lentils and 
501 to 1000 acres of peas in 2016. Also, they tend to be less experienced producers, having 
farmed between 1 and 15 years. They most frequently got advice and information on seeding 
decision from family, agri-business companies, agronomists, personal experience, and other 
farmers, and less likely to get it from the internet and media. There is a consensus with regard to 
which preference of provenance by crop type. In pulses, cereals, and oil seeds, risk-seekers most 
prefer seeds financed by royalty imbedded in seed price and voluntary checkoffs, and least prefer 
seeds financed by mandatory checkoffs, TUA, and EPR.  
 This study also profiled always risk-seekers by where they get information and advice on 
crop choices. These individuals are more likely to get information and advice from family (73%), 
agri-business (69%), agronomists (55%), personal experience (88%), and other farmers (70%), 
and less likely to get it from the media (48%), and the internet (51%). These results are 
consistent with the aggregate information and advice on crop choices results. 
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Always Risk-Averse 
 The respondents in this category are defined as choosing the risk-averse option in both 
the domain of loss and gain. The demographics of this category are almost the same as the 
always risk-seekers, the only difference being that they seeded fewer peas in 2016. Those that 
are always risk-seeking tended to seed between 501 – 1000 acres of peas on 2016 (54%), 
whereas the plurality of the always risk-averse seed between 1 and 500 acres of peas (47%).  
 Like the risk-seekers, the avoiders most prefer voluntary checkoff for all crop types; 
however, these individuals are more indifferent with regards to the funding method by crop types 
than the risk-seekers. In all three crop types, the risk avoiders are indifferent with regards to their 
preference of royalty imbedded in seed price, TUA, and EPR. There is a difference between crop 
types on their preference regarding mandatory checkoffs, with pulses and oil seeds, these 
respondents are indifferent, however, with cereals, they least prefer mandatory checkoffs.  
 Overall, risk-seekers have more consensuses between preference by crop type than 
always risk-averse and occasional risk-seekers. The always risk-averse, are largely indifferent 
than with the other two profiles. There is a strong dislike for voluntary checkoffs for all three 
profiles and a general dislike for mandatory checkoffs for all three crop types. There are fewer 
consensuses with regards to EPR, for the three crop types.  
 The always risk-seekers are more likely get their information and advice on crop choices 
from the same sources as the risk-seekers, except they are less likely to get information from 
agri-business than risk-seekers. 
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Occasional Risk-Seekers 
 These individuals are willing to take some risk in one frame but not in the other. 
Demographically, these producers are the same as those who are always risk-seekers. Like the 
other two profiles, occasional risk-seekers prefer voluntary checkoffs for all crop types. They 
least prefer mandatory checkoffs for all three crop types. However, there are fewer consensuses 
between crop types than the other profiles. For pulses and cereals, these producers prefer royalty 
imbedded in seed price, yet for oil seeds there were equal number (36%) that prefer and do not 
prefer this type of provenance. Also, with regards to EPRs, these individuals were indifferent 
when they were charged on pulses and oil seeds, but there is a preference for using EPR for 
cereals. They also prefer TUAs on pulses, yet do not prefer them on oil seeds and cereals.  
 Those who are occasionally risk-seeking get information and advice on crop choices most 
frequently from the same sources as those which are always risk-seeking, except that most the 
occasional risk-seekers sometimes get information from the media (50%) and the internet (51%), 
whereas those in the other two profiles never or occasionally get their info from these sources.  
 
Limitations 
 This study did not ask a baseline behavioral experiment question, meaning that this 
research did not include a question without provenance manipulations. This would have allowed 
a comparison with and without provenance manipulations, which would have provided more 
evidence regarding the influence provenance has on producer seed decision making. The part of 
the behavioral question that discussed manipulations was bolded which allowed respondents to 
better clarify the difference between the two problems. In retrospect, this could have potentially 
introduced some bias. While this study worded the behavioral questions in the same manner as 
		 43 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981), in some instances this could have made it difficult for 
respondents to properly solve and answer the questions. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
The issue of how to fund breeding in Canadian pulses is on the agenda of breeders for the 
first time in a very long time. The traditional P4 pulse breeding model has been the dominant 
framework, however, EPRs and their success in Australia wheat breeding has caused the industry 
to take a second look at pulse breeding. To predict the future of pulse breeding in Canada, it is 
useful to determine producer biases towards provenance and if they are influenced by cognitive 
biases such as framing. Will they choose seed based on profitability or do other factors such as 
framing or provenance have an effect? In traditional decision-making theory, it is assumed that 
people are rational beings, so that when farmers have multiple seed choices, they will choose the 
most profitable one regardless of other influences such as risk or framing or provenance. 
Eventually, Australian producers chose the rational profit maximizing wheat variety if pulse 
producers are perfectly rational, they too should choose the same option, but Kahneman and 
Tversky proved that people are not 100% rational because they are influenced by more than just 
utility. 
 This study performed a prospect theory experiment to test if provenance and framing 
influence pulse farmers’ decision making. This study gave each respondent a problem where one 
question was framed as an EPR or checkoff and one question had a positive or negative framing 
manipulation. In all the questions, most farmers chose the riskless position. This study preformed 
Chi Squares to test the statistical significance of the results against H01 and H02 concluding that 
only in the checkoff/loss manipulation did farmers’ risk tolerance significantly veer from the 
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50/50 expected utility theory (H01). In the checkoff manipulation, farmers exhibited rational 
behavior as per expected utility theory in the positive but behaved irrationally in the negative. 
Because framing influenced risk tolerance in the negative, H02 was rejected. Under EPR 
manipulations H01 and H02 failed to be rejected, therefore farmers exhibited rational behavior 
and were not influenced by provenance and framing when presented with varieties created under 
an EPR. This study tested the behavioral question results against Kahneman and Tversky (1981) 
“Asian Disease” problem and found that there was a significant difference between the two 
results.  
 This study then created a 2 X 2 table to profile the respondents based on risk tolerance. 
The three profiles are always risk-seeking, always risk-averse, and occasionally risk-seeking 
were constructed based on the behavioral experiment results. The study found that 44% of 
farmers are risk-averse under both frames, 26% are risk-seeking under both frames, 18% of 
farmers have prospect-theory-like behavior and 12% of people behave in the reverse manner 
(risk-seeking in the positive domain and vice versa). Overall, 56% of farmers are willing to take 
some level of risk and 44% are unwilling to take any risk.  
This study asked farmers their preferences on funding mechanism by commodity (pulses, 
oilseeds, cereals) and the composite and mean scores for each crop type revealed there is not a 
strong preference for a provenance. This study also, preformed a one-way ANOVA on the 
composite scored of each crop type and found there was no difference between crop types and 
provenance preferences. Therefore, their stated preference which was exposed in the provenance 
questions and their revealed funding mechanism preference in the behavioral experiment were 
similar except in the checkoff/loss question.  
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 The study then wanted to profile the respondents by asking a series of demographic and 
problems about where they get information and advice on crop choices. This study found that a 
significant number of respondent’s farm in Saskatchewan and seed pulse crops and that 
preference about funding mechanism across crop types are similar. This study also concluded 
that farmers tend to get information and advice on crop choices from family, agri-business 
companies, personal experience, and from other farmers and are less likely to get it from the 
internet and media, indicating that traditional forms of information gathering still dominate.  
 Finally, this study cross-tabulated the three risk profiles with the results from the 
information and advice questions and the funding mechanism preference by crop type to explore 
where individuals with different risk tolerances get their information and which mechanism do 
they prefer. The study found that the demographics of all three risk profiles are nearly identical, 
except that the always risk-averse seeded more acres of peas in 2016. The three risk profiles 
mostly prefer voluntary checkoffs in all three crop types. The always risk-seekers have clear 
mechanism preference, the always risk-averse are largely indifferent with regards to funding 
mechanisms than the other two profiles, and there is less consensus between funding mechanism 
by crop type for the occasional risk-seekers than the other profiles. There is near consensus on 
where these groups get their information and advice on crop decision from. They are all more 
likely to get it from family, agri-business, agronomists, personal experience, and other farmers. 
However, most of the occasional risk-seekers sometimes information from media (50%) and the 
internet (51%), whereas the individuals in the other two risk profiles are, least likely get it from 
these sources.  
What do these results say about the Saskatchewan pulse breeding system and possible 
changes to this model resulting from EPR’s? Risk-seekers are important drivers of plant breeding 
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because they are the early adopters of new varieties and therefore influence others to also adopt 
and driving one variety over another forward. The good news is that most of the producers 
surveyed (56%) are willing to take some amount of risk. Therefore, most pulse farmers can be 
early adopters of new pulse varieties and influence others to grow new pulse varieties. Generally, 
pulse producers are rational thinkers because they tend to behave closer to the 50/50 expected 
utility model regardless of checkoffs or EPR. They are generally utility maximizers; the study 
revealed they are more likely to choose the pulse variety that generates them more profit, 
regardless of the funding mechanism used. This means that most pulse producers would be 
willing to take some risk and adopt new varieties if there was the possibility of higher profits 
than alternative options.  
Through the behavioral experiment, it was revealed that the funding mechanism 
(checkoffs over EPRs) does not influence producer seed choices. This could give future pulse 
breeders greater flexibility when making plant breeder rights decisions. If producers are 
indifferent with regards to the funding mechanism, and primarily interested in profit 
maximization, then plant breeders could create an intellectual property framework for plant 
breeding that allows them to generate the greatest ROI, so long as these pulse varieties continue 
to generate more profit for producers than previous varieties.  
Policy makers emulate policy from other areas without evidence that it will succeeds in 
their jurisdiction. Policy should be evidence based and in this thesis, this study took EPRs and 
their success the Australian wheat breeding and applied it to pulse breeding. This study looked 
for evidence that Australia wheat producers and Western Canadian pulse producers behave the 
same way to varieties financed by EPRs. Once EPRs funded Australian wheat varieties had high 
enough yields, producers began to favor them over the levy funded varieties. In effect, they 
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displayed rational profit maximizing behavior. The results showed that Western Canadian pulse 
producers are mostly rational (confirmed by lack of evidence of prospect theory responses, 
except modest risk shifting in the domain of loss) and are willing to take risk and seed new 
varieties regardless of provenance. In response, this study tested to find how famers get 
information and advice on seeding decision to determine if or how technology adoption might be 
enhanced. This study identified the common pathways of communications but determined this 
aspect would benefit from further research. 
This study concluded that 56% of Western Canadian farmers are willing to take some 
degree of risk and therefore most of them would most likely be early to mid-adopters of 
technology and new inventions. If the goal is to grow more lentils in Saskatchewan, then 
industry and policy makers may find value in focusing on influencing these primary adopters to 
seed more lentils. These adopters would then persuade more producers to plant lentils.  
 Over the last 40 years, Saskatchewan has created a lentil breeding cluster which has 
attracted experts and capital that has allows breeders to innovate and create new lentil varieties 
and, in the process, position the province as a world leader in lentil research, development and 
production. The introduction of EPRs in Saskatchewan could have the potential to attract even 
more capital and plant breeding to the province. This lentil breeding infrastructure could create 
substantial opportunities for Saskatchewan producers. They could have access to higher yielding 
lentils and varieties with new traits that would enable these varieties to strive in the prairies. 
However, more producers must adopt new lentils varieties for the province to take full economic 
advantage of such efforts. If policy makers what to increase lentil production in the prairies, it 
would be beneficial to understand these risk-seeker at a more in-depth level. We need to know 
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what makes some producers early adopters of technology and what institutions could do to create 
an atmosphere where more lentils are planted annually. 
This study has concluded that farmers get their agronomic information more from their social 
network that from media sources. Policy makers may get value by mapping these social systems 
to get a more in-depth picture of what (agronomics) and who (social networks) influences farm 
seeding decisions. This would enable policy makers to more accurately locate risk seekers and 
target their messages to them. If we can find those risk seekers and primary adopters, then we 
could learn more factors beyond framing that influence seed decision making. 
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Appendix A – Survey Questions 
 
Version 1 
Survey:  
 
1. Are you involved in farm-level related decision making?  
 
Yes   
No  
 
IF NO, thank you for your interest. We have no further questions for you. 
 
2. Imagine you are planning your crop production choices for 2017, and you plan on planting 
some lentils. You need an average return of 25 bu/a to earn your target profit on that crop. 
You have 2 alternative crop varieties to choose from. Both are public varieties available 
without royalties but are subject to producer checkoffs. If variety A is adopted the crop 
will yield 20 bu/ac. If variety B is adopted, 1 in 4 fields will yield 32 bu/a but 3 out of 4 
fields will yield 16 bu/ac.  
 
Variety A  
Variety B  
 
3. Imagine you are planning your crop production choices for 2017, and you plan on planting 
some lentils. You need an average return of 25 bu/a to earn your target profit on that crop. 
You have 2 alternative crop varieties to choose from. Both are privately contracted 
niche varieties not subject to producer check-offs but obligated to pay end-point 
royalties of an equivalent amount. If variety C is adopted, the crop will yield 5 bu/acre less 
than the target, if variety D is adopted, 1 in 4 fields will yield 7 bu/a more than the target and 
3 out of 4 will yield 9 bu/a less than the target.  
 
Variety C   
Variety D  
 
Please tell us a little bit about yourself (Please tick the appropriate boxes or enter the data) 
 
4. Have you seeded pulse crops (lentils, beans, peas) within the last 5 years?  
 
Yes   
No:  
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5. What Province do you farm in?  
 
British Columbia   
Alberta       
Saskatchewan    
Manitoba      
Other       
 
 
6. How many acres of all crops did you seed on your farm in 2016?  
 
 
 
7. How many acres did you plant in 2016 to: 
 
Lentils   
Peas         
Chickpeas   
Fababeans   
Dry beans   
 
8. How many years have you been farming?  
 
 
 
 
9.   Where do you get information and advice on crop choices? 
 
  Never Occasionally Sometimes Frequently Always 
Family           
Agri-business companies           
Internet           
Media           
Agronomists           
Personal experience           
Other Farmers           
10. There are multiple ways to raise funds for research into agronomy and new varietal 
development. For the following questions, please indicate your preference by crop type: 
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FOR PULSES 
 
Strongly 
Against 
Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately 
For 
Strongly 
for 
Royalty imbedded in seed price      
Royalty paid through contract 
technology use agreements 
     
Mandatory checkoff      
Voluntary/refundable checkoff      
End-point royalties      
 
 
FOR CEREALS Strongly 
Against 
Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately 
For 
Strongly 
for 
Royalty imbedded in seed price      
Royalty paid through contract 
(e.g. technology use agreements) 
     
Mandatory checkoff      
Voluntary/refundable checkoff      
End-point royalties      
 
 
FOR OILSEEDS Strongly 
Against 
Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately 
For 
Strongly 
for 
Royalty imbedded in seed price      
Royalty paid through contract 
technology use agreements 
     
Mandatory checkoff      
Voluntary/refundable checkoff      
End-point royalties      
 
 
11. Multiple funding mechanisms (i.e. patents, checkoffs) are used in many crop categories. How 
concerned are you about the use of multiple or stacked mechanism for the same crop?  
 
Strongly opposed     
Moderately opposed   
Indifferent           
Moderately support    
Strongly support      
 
THANK YOU. PLEASE RETURN THIS TO THE SURVEY MANAGER. 
 
		 56 
Version 2 
SURVEY 
1. Are you involved in farm-level related decision making?  
 
Yes   
No  
 
 
IF NO, thank you for your interest. We have no further questions for you. 
 
 
2. Imagine you are planning your crop production choices for 2017, and you plan on planting 
some lentils. You need an average return of 25 bu/a to earn your target profit on that crop. 
You have 2 alternative crop varieties to choose from. Both are public varieties available 
without royalties but are subject to producer checkoffs. If variety A is adopted, the crop 
will yield 5 bu/acre less than the target, if variety B is adopted, 1 in 4 fields will yield 7 bu/a 
more than the target and 3 out of 4 will yield 9 bu/a less than the target.   
 
Variety A  
Variety B  
 
3. Imagine you are planning your crop production choices for 2017, and you plan on planting 
some lentils. You need an average return of 25 bu/a to earn your target profit on that crop. 
You have 2 alternative crop varieties to choose from. Both are privately contracted 
niche varieties not subject to producer check-offs but obligated to pay end-point 
royalties of an equivalent amount. If variety C is adopted the crop will yield 20 bu/a. If 
variety D is adopted, 1 in 4 fields will yield 32 bu/a but 3 out of 4 will yield 16 bu/ac.   
 
Variety C   
Variety D  
 
 
Please tell us a little bit about yourself (Please tick the appropriate boxes or enter the data) 
 
4. Have you seeded pulse crops (lentils, beans, peas) within the last 5 years?  
 
Yes   
No:  
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5. What Province do you farm in?  
 
British Columbia   
Alberta           
Saskatchewan     
Manitoba         
Other           
 
 
6. How many acres of all crops did you seed on your farm in 2016?  
 
 
 
7. How many acres did you plant in 2016 to: 
 
Lentils   
Peas         
Chickpeas   
Fababeans   
Dry beans   
 
8. How many years have you been farming?  
 
 
 
 
9.   Where do you get information and advice on crop choices? 
 
  Never Occasionally Sometimes Frequently Always 
Family           
Agri-business companies           
Internet           
Media           
Agronomists           
Personal experience           
Other Farmers           
 
10. There are multiple ways to raise funds for research into agronomy and new varietal 
development. For the following questions, please indicate your preference by crop type: 
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FOR PULSES 
 
Strongly 
Against 
Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately 
For 
Strongly 
for 
Royalty imbedded in seed price      
Royalty paid through contract 
technology use agreements 
     
Mandatory checkoff      
Voluntary/refundable checkoff      
End-point royalties      
 
 
FOR CEREALS Strongly 
Against 
Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately 
For 
Strongly 
for 
Royalty imbedded in seed price      
Royalty paid through contract 
(e.g. technology use agreements) 
     
Mandatory checkoff      
Voluntary/refundable checkoff      
End-point royalties      
 
 
FOR OILSEEDS Strongly 
Against 
Moderately 
Against 
Indifferent Moderately 
For 
Strongly 
for 
Royalty imbedded in seed price      
Royalty paid through contract 
technology use agreements 
     
Mandatory checkoff      
Voluntary/refundable checkoff      
End-point royalties      
 
 
11. Multiple funding mechanisms (i.e. patents, checkoffs) are used in many crop categories. How 
concerned are you about the use of multiple or stacked mechanism for the same crop?  
 
Strongly opposed     
Moderately opposed   
Indifferent           
Moderately support    
Strongly support      
 
THANK YOU. PLEASE RETURN THIS TO THE SURVEY MANAGER. 
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Appendix B – Consent Form 
 
Participant Consent Form   
   
Researcher: Stephen Fransoo, Masters of Public Policy Student, JSGS School of Public Policy, University 
of Saskatchewan, 1-306-261-1299, sjf413@mail.usask.ca 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Peter Phillips, JSGS School of Public Policy, University of Saskatchewan 1-306-966-
4021, peter.phillips@usask.ca 
 
Purpose and Objective of the Research:  
• The objective and purpose of this project are to investigate how different presentations and 
contexts affect producer seed purchasing decisions. 
• Participation in this study involves answering 11 questions. This web-based questionnaire will 
take approximately 5 minutes 
• Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the procedures and goals of the study or your role. 
Potential Risks:  
• There are no known risks to participating in this survey; however, as with any online related 
activity the risk of breach of confidentiality is always possible. 
• At the end of the survey, there will be a debriefing form to remind you of the objectives, purposes 
of this study and directions that will give you access to a final draft of the study  
• You can terminate your participation in this survey at any time by leaving the questionnaire web 
page. If you choose to terminate your involvement, your responses will not be recorded or used in 
this study 
Confidentiality:  
• All your responses are confidential and anonymous, no identifiable information will be collected 
• Your responses will be used to complete my Master’s thesis and when my project is complete 
your responses will be kept for 5 years in the digital database at the University of Saskatchewan 
Social Sciences Research Lab  
• Your responses will be deleted 5 years after the completion of my Master’s Thesis 
Right to Withdraw:  
• Your participation is voluntary and you can answer only those questions that you are comfortable 
with. You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any time without 
explanation or penalty of any sort. 
• Should you wish to withdraw, your responses will not be recorded or used in this study 
Follow up: 
• To obtain the results of this study please contact the researchers at their email addresses provided 
above 
Questions or Concerns:  
• Contact the researcher(s) using the information at the top of page 1; 
• This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Research Ethics Board. Any questions regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to 
that committee through the Research Ethics Office ethics.office@usask.ca (306) 966-2975. Out 
of town participants may call toll free (888) 966-2975. 
 
If you wish to participate in this questionnaire, please fill in the form. 
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Appendix C – Debriefing Form 
Debriefing Form 
Thank you for participating in this study! The goal of this research is to shed light on farmer 
decision making, particularly when choices are framed differently. According to prospect theory, 
we tend to take greater risk when a question is framed as a loss and less risk when it framed as a 
gain regardless of the profit potential of both choices. The purpose of this study is to evaluate if 
the framing of questions affects a farmer’s decision to purchase lentil seed that was funded by a 
producer checkoff or an end-point-royalty (EPR). The ratification of UPOV 91 in Canada gives 
developers of new varieties the ability to charge an end-point-royalty which could increase their 
return on investment and spur greater private sector investment in pulse research and 
development. This new EPR framework would compete with the current producer checkoff pulse 
breeding framework. Ultimately, producer seed purchasing decisions will decide which pulse 
breeding framework will succeed and this study will determine if farmers make choices based 
purely on profit or are there other factors such as the framing of choices or the seed funding 
mechanism itself that contribute to producer decision making. 
 
In this study, we gave you one question where you choose between 2 EPR funded lentil varieties 
and one where you choose between 2 producer checkoff-funded varieties. Also, one of the 
questions was framed as a gain relative to the 25 bu/a reference and the other was framed as a 
loose relative to the reference point. In both question, you had the option of choosing a variety 
that generated you a guaranteed yield and a riskier option that gave you a 75% chance of 
generating a lower yield and a 25% chance of generating a higher yield that the guaranteed 
option. You may have noticed that if you added the values of the riskier options they equal that 
of the guaranteed option. As previously mentioned, other studies have found that even when the 
value of two choices are equal, in the domain of gain we tend to choose the guaranteed choice 
and in the domain of losing we tend to choose the riskier choice. There are two different versions 
of this questionnaire. In one of them, the question that was framed as a gain, lentil varieties are 
created under an EPR and the other question that was framed as a loss, lentil varieties were 
created under a producer checkoff system. In the other questionnaire, the funding mechanism is 
reversed.  You also gave some demographic and business strategy questions that will allow us to 
see if there are correlations between these responses and farmer decision making. The purpose of 
this study to determine if varieties funded under an EPR framework changed producer lentil 
variety preferences.  
 
Thank you for participating in this study! Your responses were completely anonymous and 
confidential. If you have any questions regarding this study, please email Stephen Fransoo 
(sjf413@mail.usask.ca) or Dr. Peter Phillips (peter.phillips@usask.ca). If you would like to 
obtain the results of this study, please contact the researchers at the above email addresses. 
 
Best, 
Stephen Fransoo 
MPP Student, University of Saskatchewan 
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Appendix D: Cross Tabulations 
 
 
The following tables involve respondents that answered “Frequently” or “Always” for each 
information source. 
 
Demographics and Provenance to Information Sources Cross Tabulations 
 Family  Agri-
business 
 
Internet Media Agronomists Personal 
Experience 
Other 
Farmers 
Pulses Seeded (%) 78.8 81.5 85.3 75.0 78.1 85.4 81.3 
Province (%)        
Alberta 9.1 3.7 11.8 8.3 0 6.8 8.8 
Saskatchewan 81.4 88.9 82.4 83.3 89.1 83.5 86.3 
Manitoba 9.1 7.4 5.9 8.3 9.4 8.7 5.0 
Others 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 0 
Acres in 2016 (%)        
1-5000 60 69.8 68.8 72.7 68.8 63.4 67.1 
5001-10000 30.8 18.9 28.1 27.3 18.8 30.7 24.1 
10001-15000 1.5 5.7 3.1 0 4.7 3.0 3.8 
15001-20000 7.7 5.7 0 0 7.8 3.0 5.1 
Acres/crop (%)        
Lentils        
1-500 65 70.6 83.3 100 68 69.4 68 
501-1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1501-3000 15 17.6 16.7 0 16 19.4 20 
3001-4500 0 0 0 0 4 2.8 0 
4501-6000 20 11.8 0 0 12 8.3 12 
Peas        
1-500 51.6 56 44.4 40 55.6 50 57.9 
501-1000 35.5 28 44.4 40 25.9 35.2 28.9 
1001-1500 12.9 16 11.1 20 18.5 13 10.5 
1501-2000 0 0 0 0 0 1.9 2.6 
Years farmed        
1-15 64.5 46.3 45.5 33.3 46 42.9 52.6 
16-30 21 24.1 27.3 33.3 25.4 27.6 23.1 
31-45 14.5 25.9 27.3 33.3 25.4 27.6 23.1 
46-60 0 3.7 0 0 3.2 2.0 1.3 
 
Provenance by 
Commodity (%) 
       
Cereals        
Royalty in Seed 
Price 
       
Strongly Against 15.2 13.7 14.7 0 13.6 15.2 11.7 
Moderately Against 16.7 17.6 20.6 25 23.7 20.2 18.2 
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Indifferent 36.4 27.5 29.4 25 27.1 27.3 28.6 
Moderately For 22.7 29.4 26.5 25 27.1 28.3 28.6 
Strongly For 9.1 11.8 8.8 25 8.5 9.1 10 
TUA        
Strongly Against 15.2 15.7 17.6 16.7 18.6 19.4 13 
Moderately Against 19.7 27.5 17.6 41.7 22 21.4 23.4 
Indifferent 39.4 33.3 41.2 25 32.2 34.7 35.1 
Moderately For 24.2 23.5 20.6 17.7 25.4 22.4 26 
Strongly For 1.5 0 2.9 0 1.7 2 2.6 
Mandatory 
Checkoff 
       
Strongly Against 10.6 11.5 8.8 8.3 11.7 15.2 14.1 
Moderately Against 30.3 25 32.4 41.7 26.7 23.3 25.6 
Indifferent 33.3 28.8 26.5 25 30 30.3 29.5 
Moderately For 19.7 23.1 14.7 8.3 18.3 24.2 23.1 
Strongly For 6.1 11.5 17.6 16.7 13.3 7.1 7.7 
Voluntary 
Checkoff 
       
Strongly Against 10.8 15.1 17.6 16.7 9.7 16 11.5 
Moderately Against 9.2 7.5 8.8 8.3 8.1 8 7.7 
Indifferent 32.3 28.3 17.6 33.3 27.4 24 28.2 
Moderately For 33.8 34 29.4 25 33.9 34 33.3 
Strongly For 13.8 15.1 26.5 16.7 21 18 19.2 
EPR        
Strongly Against 12.3 17.6 14.7 16.7 11.9 14.4 15.8 
Moderately Against 18.5 17.6 14.7 8.3 20.3 17.5 17.1 
Indifferent 38.5 29.4 26.5 25 37.3 35.1 34.2 
Moderately For 18.5 17.6 26.5 25 20.3 21.6 18.4 
Strongly For 12.3 17.6 17.6 25 10.2 11.3 14.5 
Oil Seeds        
Royalty in Seed 
Price 
       
Strongly Against 15.4 10 20.6 8.3 16.9 15.3 13 
Moderately Against 13.8 20 20.6 33.3 22 18.4 19.5 
Indifferent 27.7 24 35.3 0 25.4 28.6 27.3 
Moderately For 35.4 36 20.6 41.7 27.1 30.6 31.2 
Strongly For 7.7 10 2.9 16.7 8.5 7.1 9.1 
 
TUA        
Strongly Against 10.8 16 17.6 8.3 16.9 16.2 10.4 
Moderately Against 21.5 22 20.6 41.7 16.9 23.2 23.4 
Indifferent 36.9 34 35.3 8.3 33.9 37.4 36.4 
Moderately For 30.8 28 23.5 33.3 27.1 21.2 27.3 
Strongly For 0 0 2.9 8.3 5.1 2 2.6 
        
		 63 
Mandatory 
Checkoff 
Strongly Against 13.8 11.8 8.8 8.3 11.7 16.2 15.4 
Moderately Against 26.2 23.5 29.4 41.7 25 22.2 21.8 
Indifferent 32.2 25.5 26.5 0 21.7 27.3 29.5 
Moderately For 26.2 27.5 20.6 33.3 26.7 27.3 25.6 
Strongly For 1.5 11.8 14.7 16.7 15 7.1 7.7 
Voluntary 
Checkoff 
       
Strongly Against 9.2 15.4 17.6 25 12.9 15.8 11.5 
Moderately Against 10.8 5.8 8.8 8.3 4.8 6.9 6.4 
Indifferent 35.4 34.6 23.5 16.7 32.3 29.7 37.2 
Moderately For 36.9 28.8 26.5 33.3 32.3 31.7 28.2 
Strongly For 7.7 15.4 23.5 16.7 17.7 15.8 16.7 
EPR        
Strongly Against 14.1 18 17.6 27.3 13.6 15.5 16.9 
Moderately Against 17.2 12 8.8 9.1 16.9 15.5 15.6 
Indifferent 34.4 30 29.4 18.2 35.6 35.1 33.8 
Moderately For 18.8 26 29.4 27.3 23.7 22.7 20.8 
Strongly For 15.6 14 14.7 18.2 10.2 11.3 13 
Pulses        
Royalty in Seed 
Price 
       
Strongly Against 15.2 15.4 14.7 25 13.1 18.2 13.9 
Moderately Against 9.1 9.6 14.7 58.3 16.4 12.1 12.7 
Indifferent 28.8 23.1 29.4 0 19.7 28.3 25.3 
Moderately For 36.4 36.5 35.3 0 37.7 32.3 35.4 
Strongly For 10.6 15.4 5.9 16.7 13.1 9.1 12.7 
TUA        
Strongly Against 13.6 15.7 11.8 16.7 18.3 18.2 12.7 
Moderately Against 19.7 21.6 23.5 41.7 16.7 18.2 24.1 
Indifferent 33.3 25.5 35.3 8.3 28.3 35.4 26.6 
Moderately For 31.8 33.3 23.5 33.3 33.3 25.3 34.2 
Strongly For 1.5 3.9 5.9 0 3.3 3 2.5 
 
Mandatory 
Checkoff 
       
Strongly Against 15.2 15.7 11.8 25 15 18 19 
Moderately Against 25.8 23.5 26.5 33.3 25 21 20.3 
Indifferent 31.8 27.5 32.4 0 30 31 31.6 
Moderately For 24.2 29.4 14.7 33.3 25 25 24.1 
Strongly For 3 3.9 14.7 8.3 5 5 5.1 
Voluntary        
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Checkoff 
Strongly Against 9.1 17 14.7 25 12.7 15.7 12.5 
Moderately Against 9.1 3.8 8.8 8.3 6.3 6.9 6.3 
Indifferent 31.8 37.7 20.6 25 30.2 27.5 35 
Moderately For 39.4 28.3 35.3 33.3 36.5 35.3 30 
Strongly For 10.6 13.2 20.6 8.3 14.3 14.7 16.3 
EPR        
Strongly Against  18.2 21.6 17.6 33.3 20 19.2 19 
Moderately Against 13.6 9.8 11.8 16.7 15 15.2 15.2 
Indifferent 36.4 31.4 32.4 8.3 38.3 36.4 36.7 
Moderately For 19.7 27.5 26.5 33.3 21.7 21.2 20.3 
Strongly For 12.1 9.8 11.8 8.3 5 8.1 8.9 
 
Multiple 
Funding 
Mechanism 
Strongly 
Opposed 
Moderately 
Opposed 
Indifferent Moderately 
Support 
Strongly 
Support 
Family (%) 21.2 27.3 31.8 18.2 1.5 
Agri-Business 
(%) 
31.5 25.9 20.4 20.4 1.9 
Internet (%) 17.6 32.4 32.4 14.7 2.9 
Media (%) 33.3 25 25 8.3 8.3 
Agronomists 
(%) 
32.8 23.4 28.1 14.1 1.6 
Personal 
Experience (%) 
28.2 26.2 31.1 14.6 0 
Other Farmers 
(%) 
26.3 28.8 27.5 16.3 1.3 
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Appendix	E:	Survey	Data	
	
	
Q1 Version Q2	C/G Q2	C/L Q2	EPR	L Q2	EPR/G Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7	L Q7	P Q7	C Q7	F Q7	D Q8 Q9	Family
1 1 2 1 1 3 6500 1000 15 2
1 2 2 1 1 4 3200 460 18 5
1 1 1 2 1 4 5000 130 14 2
1 1 1 2 1 4 6600 0 1000 0 0 0 15 2
1 1 1 1 2 3 3900 0 0 0 0 0 12 2
1 2 1 2 1 3 4500 0 900 0 0 0 40 3
1 1 1 1 1 4 2850 0 0 0 0 0 11 3
1 2 2 1 1 3 3000 500 6 2
1 2 1 1 1 3 4400 1760 0 0 0 0 31 1
1 1 1 1 1 4 3000 450 20 5
1 2 1 1 1 3 5000 0 900 0 0 320 20 3
1 1 1 1 1 2 5500 160 1200 0 0 0 15 4
1 1 1 1 1 3 6000 1100 0 0 0 0 15 5
1 2 1 1 2 5 865 0 0 0 0 0 35 1
1 2 1 1 1 2 9000 3000 0 0 0 0 17 3
1 2 1 1 2 4 8800 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
1 1 1 1 1 3 2200 600 32 3
1 2 1 1 1 3 2100 450 30 6 3
1 2 2 2 1 2 5000 450 800 0 300 0 10 4
1 2 1 1 1 2 2000 0 300 0 0 80 30 3
1 2 1 1 1 4 6500 0 0 0 0 0 32 4
1 2 1 2 1 3 10000 140 400 24 2
1 2 1 2 1 3 10000 0 0 0 0 0 5 4
1 1 1 2 1 3 3800 1000 40 1
1 1 1 2 1 4 2000 0 0 0 0 0 12 3
1 1 2 2 1 3 1000 1000 4
1 1 1 1 1 3 504 250 35 3
1 2 1 1 1 3 10000 0 0 0 0 0 5 4
1 1 1 2 1 3 5000 12 500 11 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 2000 0 400 0 0 0 4 5
1 1 2 2 1 3 2000 1 600 0 1 1 1 3
1 1 1 1 1 3 756 0 280 0 0 0 21 1
1 1 2 2 1 3 5000 1500 1000 0 0 0 15 4
1 1 2 2 1 3 3600 0 0 0 0 0 6 5
1 1 1 2 1 3 7200 0 0 0 0 0 10 5
1 1 1 1 1 2 7200 0 640 0 0 0 4 4
1 1 2 2 1 3 7200 0 600 0 0 0 35 2
1 1 1 1 1 3 7700 0 500 0 0 0 7 4
1 1 1 1 1 3 8000 0 400 0 0 0 23 4
1 1 1 1 1 2 4000 0 900 0 0 0 13 5
1 1 1 2 1 3 3600 0 0 0 0 0 33 4
1 1 2 1 2 3 300 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
1 1 1 2 1 3 13700 300 1500 0 0 0 29 2
1 1 1 1 1 3 8500 2000 2000 2000 640 0 40 2
1 1 2 1 1 3 3000 0 500 0 0 0 50 2
1 1 2 1 1 3 1000 280 0 0 0 0 20 4
1 1 2 2 1 3 1000 160 0 0 0 0 23 2
1 1 2 2 2 3 1750 0 0 0 0 0 45 4
1 1 2 2 2 3 300 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
1 1 1 1 1 3 1850 0 480 0 0 0 35 1
1 1 1 1 1 3 4800 700 800 0 0 0 10 3
1 1 2 2 1 3 7500 60 0 0 0 0 30 1
1 1 2 1 1 3 7500 2000 0 0 0 0 10 5
1 1 1 1 1 3 3100 0 900 0 0 1100 11 4
1 1 1 1 1 3 5800 0 0 0 0 0 12 4
1 1 1 2 2 3 700 300 0 0 0 0 0 5
1 1 2 2 1 3 10000 0 0 0 0 0 30 3
1 1 1 1 1 3 4000 160 640 0 0 0 6 4
1 1 2 2 2 3 20000 0 0 0 0 0 14 5
1 1 1 2 1 3 3000 2000 0 0 0 0 11 4
1 1 1 1 1 2 2500 0 700 0 0 0 40 3
1 1 1 2 1 3 3600 0 400 0 0 0 44 2
1 1 2 2 2 3 1500 0 0 0 90 0 11 3
1 1 2 1 1 3 17500 5000 0 0 0 0 23 1
1 1 1 1 1 3 17500 5000 0 0 0 0 6 4
1 1 1 1 1 3 1000 0 350 0 0 0 22 2
1 1 2 2 1 3 5000 0 1200 0 0 0 40 5
1 1 1 1 1 3 20000 600 1200 0 0 0 50
1 1 1 1 1 3 3200 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 1 2 2 2 3 2400 0 0 0 0 0 33 4
1 1 1 2 1 3 5150 2000 0 3000 50 0 59 1
1 1 2 2 2 3 1900 0 0 0 0 0 10 5
1 1 2 2 2 3 360 0 0 0 0 0 3 4
1 1 2 2 1 3 2000 0 0 0 0 0 32 2
1 1 2 2 1 3 1200 0 320 0 0 0 12 4
1 1 1 1 2 3 8200 0 0 0 0 0 10 3
1 1 1 1 1 3 5600 0 300 0 0 0 6 4
1 1 1 1 2 2 1200 0 0 0 0 0 5 4
1 1 1 1 1 3 1000 300 0 0 0 0 40 3
1 1 1 2 2 3 1600 0 0 0 0 0 25 2
1 1 2 1 1 3 4000 0 0 0 580 0 36 2
1 1 2 1 1 3 28000 0 0 0 0 0 40 3
1 1 2 1 1 4 9200 245 1100 0 0 180 6 4
1 2 2 2 1 3 3600 0 0 0 0 0 30 4
1 2 2 2 1 3 0 620 0 0 0 36 4
1 2 1 1 1 3 7200 0 640 0 0 0 4
1 2 1 1 1 3 7200 0 400 0 0 0 7 4
1 2 1 1 2 3 900 0 0 0 0 0 10 3
1 2 1 1 2 3 3500 0 0 0 0 0 56 3
1 2 1 1 2 3 300 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
1 2 1 2 1 3 13700 300 1500 0 0 0 33 3
1 2 1 1 1 3 1250 360 360 0 0 0 1 5
1 2 1 1 1 3 9000 3200 1100 0 0 0 20 2
1 2 1 1 1 3 2500 1100 0 0 0 0 25 4
1 2 2 2 2 3 1750 0 0 0 0 0 10 4
1 2 2 1 2 3 2700 0 0 0 0 0 42 5
1 2 1 1 1 3 5000 1000 1000 0 0 0 5 4
1 2 1 2 1 3 3000 0 160 0 0 0 35
1 2 1 2 1 3 1000 1000 0 0 0 40 2
1 2 1 1 1 3 6000 2000 0 0 0 0 15 2
1 2 2 2 1 3 10000 0 0 0 0 0 6 4
1 2 2 2 1 3 10000 0 1000 0 0 0 25 3
1 2 2 2 1 3 10000 0 0 0 0 0 30 4
1 2 1 1 1 3 2500 0 700 0 0 0 10 3
1 2 1 1 1 3 3500 400 600 0 0 0 22 4
1 2 1 1 1 3 17000 6000 0 0 0 0 36 4
1 2 2 2 2 3 400 0 0 0 0 0 45 4
1 2 2 2 1 3 17500 5800 0 0 0 0 22 4
1 2 1 2 1 3 5000 1800 0 0 0 0 11 3
1 2 1 1 1 3 7000 1100 260 0 0 0 19 3
1 2 2 2 1 3 17200 5800 0 0 0 0 13 4
1 2 2 2 1 3 3200 0 500 0 0 0 20 5
1 2 1 2 1 3 5000 2000 0 0 0 0 9 3
1 2 1 1 1 3 4200 160 800 0 0 0 50
1 2 2 1 1 3 2000 0 400 0 0 0 25 5
1 2 2 1 1 3 0 570 0 0 0 3
1 2 1 1 1 3 1000 0 400 0 300 0 30 5
1 2 2 2 1 3 2700 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
1 2 1 2 1 3 1500 0 420 0 0 0 6 4
1 2 1 1 1 3 5600 0 300 0 0 0 10 4
1 2 2 2 1 3 2350 0 270 0 160 0 30 1
1 2 1 1 1 3 6000 2000 1400 0 0 0 4
1 2 2 1 2 3 7800 0 0 0 0 0 10 1
1 2 1 1 1 3 4800 0 0 0 580 0 27 4
1 2 1 1 1 3 3100 0 0 0 0 0 40 1
1 2 2 2 1 4 1000 0 160 0 0 320 5 4
1 2 2 2 1 3 12000 160 400 0 0 160 3 5
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